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Abstract 
Experts’ judgement is employed in offshore risk assessment because reliable failure data for 
quantitative risk analysis are scarce. The challenges with this practice lies with knowledge-
based uncertainties which renders risk expression and estimation, hence components’ risk-
based prioritisation, subjective to the assessor – even for the same case study. In this paper, a 
new risk assessment framework is developed to improve the fidelity and consistency of 
prioritisation of components of complex offshore engineering systems based on expert 
judgement. Unlike other frameworks, such as the Failure Mode and Effect Criticality 
Analysis, it introduces two additional dimensions: variables and parameters, to allow more 
effective scoring. These additional dimensions provide the much needed and uniform 
information that will assist experts with the estimation of probability of occurrence, severity 
of consequence and safeguards, herein referred to as 3-D methodology. In so doing, it 
achieves a more systematic approach to risk description and estimation compared to the 
conventional Risk Priority Number (RPN) of FMECA. Finally, the framework is 
demonstrated on a real case study of a wave energy converter (WEC) and conclusions of the 
assessment proved well in comparison and prioritization. 
Keywords: Condition-based risk assessment, risk estimation, multi-criteria risk assessment, 
wave energy converter. 
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1. Introduction 
The establishment of effective safety routines ensures extended and efficient operations, 
increasing production and lowering levelized cost of energy (LCOE), and consequently 
increasing the competitive advantage of operators. Defined as “…the ratio of the total cost of 
the power source to the total energy output over its life…” LCOE forms a commonly used 
metric to compare the costs of various energy generation technologies. Considering that 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) is distributed over a larger production output, as a result of 
more efficient management lower LCOE holds the key to a significant increase in return on 
investment (ROI). 
Generally, cost of safety processes such as Inspection, Repair and Maintenance (IRM) for 
offshore energy structures is abysmally high compared to those in onshore locations. An 
effective maintenance plan deploys the limited resources to target the most urgent failure 
modes [1,2] but such decision-making is difficult as it is hard to predict what would be the 
consequences of a decision, especially when it involves high risk and large uncertainties [3]. 
It is in this context that risk analysis is adopted as an essential decision support tool to 
anticipate all the uncertainties, study the likely outcome and take a guided decision. Risk 
analysis techniques identify the possible sources of hazards and quantify/estimate the 
attributes of likelihood of occurrence, consequence and possibility of detection [4]. The 
challenge of risk analysis approaches for use as a decision support tool lies in the detail to 
which it is capable of considering risk contributory factors, the clarity of risk expression and 
risk-level estimation [5], and the procedure for risk comparison. In situations where there is 
lack of accurate failure data for use in quantitative analysis, these descriptions are carried out 
qualitatively by experts who draw from a wealth of long standing experience and common 
sense in the subject matter to make judgements. However, these judgements suffer linguistic, 
lexical and informal uncertainties [6,7] such that analyses’ conclusions are subjective to the 
expert and incomparable [8]. 
Amongst the various solutions proposed by different authors [1,9–11], FMEA is the most 
widely practised [12–19]. FMEA’s simplified semi-quantitative framework possesses the 
combined advantages of quantitative and qualitative features it uses to describe the risk 
criteria; Occurrence (O), Severity (S) of the effect and Failure detection (D), and integrates 
them on a multiplicative scale to give a single-point measure of risk ranking as shown in (1).  
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However, use of FMEA is not without its own criticisms. In fact in [20,21], O, S, and D are 
classified as high (system)-level evaluation criteria, i.e., ones that give low-levels of detail, 
and end up in top-level estimates of risk level. Such analysis will lead to results that are not 
only highly subjective but also non-repeatable [8]. Risk level estimation based on 
Multiplicative aggregation models, such as found in Risk Priority Number (RPN), are also 
criticised in [6], as always giving an inconsistent variance of risk scores. Still on RPN, [22] 
raises questions on a number of issues, such as – i) the use of the ordinal ranking numbers as 
numeric quantities (i.e., referring to multiplication), ii) the presence of “holes” constituting a 
large part of the RPN measurement scale, iii) duplicate RPN values with very different 
combinations of O, S and D scores, and iv) the high sensitivity to small changes. Figure 1 
shows the plot of RPN against frequency of a random combination of O, S and D. Holes are 
shown as portions of discontinuities between successive RPNs in multiplicative scales. The 
direct consequence of ‘sensitivity to small changes’ is that errors due to uncertainties 
associated with the judgement of O, S and D becomes exaggerated. This is demonstrated in 
(2) and (3). As can be seen in each of the parentheses of (3), the errors in judgement of O, S 
and D, denoted as o , s  and d  respectively, are exaggerated when multiplied. These make 
FMEA analysis results non-repeatable and subjective, and their interpretation problematic.  
[( ) ( ) ( )]RPN O o S s D d O S D             (2) 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Figure 1 Holes shown in Frequency versus RPN plot 
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This paper develops a framework for prioritising components of offshore structures based on 
estimated risk level as a decision support for resource allocation or other forms of 
intervention action. Because there will always be more failure modes to mitigate than there 
are resources available, this makes the framework a cost-effective risk management tool. The 
basic assumptions of the proposed framework are that: a) risk exposure is a listing of failure 
modes, variables and parameters, b) the components are exposed differently to different risk 
sources, c) failure results from a combination of the listed failure modes/mechanism, and d) 
that any two or more assessors given detailed information on the conditions of exposures will 
arrive at the same conclusions on frequency of failure, severity of consequence and 
“provision of safe guards” for each component.  
The above assumptions are actually part of the rationale behind the model. Most known risk 
analysis method follow this assumption of finite listing of failure modes/mechanisms, 
variables and parameters, whereas in reality, the listing is infinite. This is one of the 
shortcoming of risk analysis ideology as a whole because it is not the known failure 
modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters that is the problem, but rather the unknown 
ones. This is why continuous study of risk is encouraged. The second assumption describes 
the structure of the model to accommodate cases where the components are exposed to the 
same risk. In such case the performance scores of the components under the rest of risk 
sources not considered is set at zero. The third assumption sets the limits of the methodology 
to generic failure modes/mechanisms highlighting that not-known risks should also be 
included in the analysis through following a similar rationale as the one developed for the 
generic ones. Finally, reproducibility of the methodology is a key enabler of this method as it 
allows to overcome some of the key barriers of traditional risk assessment methods. 
Efforts are concerted on achieving a more systematic expression/description and estimation 
of risk for different components under different failure modes/mechanisms. Though 
expressions of risk description and estimation broken down to low-levels of detail make risk 
assessment and decision making process cumbersome, however, it further helps clear areas of 
uncertainty and most importantly provides documented evidence for arriving at operational 
decisions, thus reducing errors due to subjectivity. It is in this context that Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA) is often employed to handle issues of incomplete information 
and to facilitate systemic understanding. As part of the required analytical steps, the elicited 
scores, with parameters’ weight are aggregated to derive an index for rank-ordering. These 
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are demonstrated on the real case study of a wave energy converter (WEC). Furthermore, the 
concept of Safeguard is introduced (expanding the concept of Detection in FMEA) to 
represent existing failure mitigating measures, recognising the fact that the extent of risk due 
to a specific failure mechanism is dependent on the availability and efficiency of relevant 
safeguards.  
2.0 A Framework for Condition-based Risk assessment model 
2.1 Understanding risk 
To describe the concept of risk, as used in this context, imagine any source of injury or harm 
(hazard) to assets, personnel, image etc., and an activity (or inactivity) involving that source. 
By risk analysis, an attempt is made to envision how the future will develop; it attempts to 
anticipate; i –what can go wrong? ii –how likely is it to happen?, and iii –if it does happen, 
what are the consequences’ severity? iv –what provisions can be put in place to prevent or 
mitigate the consequence and/or consequence escalation? The first question is interpreted as –
all the probable failure mechanisms and hazardous events, f i. Kaplan [23] answers the second 
question by imagining a thought experiment in which the proposed course of action or 
inaction is undertaken M– number of times in which scenario f i occurred m times. Then the 
frequency of scenario f i can be estimated based on simple mathematics of calculation of 
probability, ∅𝑖 = (𝑚 𝑀⁄ )𝑖. In situations where there is not enough data or the experiment is 
resource intensive, i expands to probability distribution over ∅𝑖, 𝑝(∅𝑖). In this text, both ∅𝑖 
and 𝑝(∅𝑖) will be referred to as occurrence O. The third question is about the expected 
consequences and severity of embarking on the action or inaction, S. The final question refers 
to the identified measures to prevent, mitigate the consequences and/or consequence 
escalation. This will be denoted as Gs. 
 
Figure 2 Frequency (∅) and probability of frequency, 𝑝(∅) 
( )n

( )p 
n
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Complete answers to these questions will contain a set of all the scenarios, probability of 
frequency (or just frequency) and measures of damages as well as safeguards as shown in (4). 
This is referred to as risk. 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
i i i i
N N N N
f O S G
f O S G
R
f O S G
f O S G
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 (4) 
2.2 Description of Framework 
The methodology proposed in this paper fundamentally consists of elements of risk 
assessment i.e., identification, analysis and evaluation of hazard sources [4]. The contribution 
is the systematic approach, depth of analysis and complexity of the systems to which the 
method is being applied. The framework shares some common features with FMEA in that 
risk is described by O, S and D. However, unlike the latter, it introduces the concept of 
Safeguard Gs and further provides more details to assist the Decision Maker (DM) in 
judgement of these risk descriptors. Variables (x) and Parameters (p) are defined giving in-
depth information on physical, operational and environmental conditions of the components 
necessary for making informed judgement. A “fundament unit” of the evaluation sheet has 
the structure shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Fundamental unit of analysis model 
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where x represents the set of variables representing attributes of physical, operational and 
environmental conditions that influences O, S, and Gs, and p represents different parameters 
used to qualify x. 
As an illustration, consider the threat of external corrosion (𝑓𝑖, 𝑖 = 1) on an offshore 
component; one of the variables of Occurrence (𝑥𝑗
𝑂; 𝑗 = 1) being the “Microbial activity of 
exposure to environment” can be qualified by parameters, 𝑝𝑘,1
𝑂 ;  𝑘 = 1,2,3, where 1-class of 
sediment, 2-organic content of sediment, and 3-availability of nitrogen and phosphorous. 
Each parameter is further qualified by a conditions-based class with each class assigned a 
marching value in a range of 0 – 5 on the measurement scale [6,20] as shown in Table 1.  
The illustration shown in Table 1, using the threat of external corrosion, is only indicative. A 
comprehensive table covers all the identified threats to components fi: internal corrosion 
(INC), threats from welding assembly and construction (WAC), manufacturing defects 
(MAD), fatigue (FTG), overloading and impact (O&I), third-party damage (TPD), climate 
and external force (CEF) and incorrect operations (ICO). An example of a typical evaluation 
sheet is shown in Figure 4. This usually will contain as many fundamental units (Figure 3) as 
there are failure mode/mechanisms. 
 
Table 1 Illustration of framework for analysis of threat of external corrosion 
Variable Parameter  
W
g
t Evaluation criteria 
Microbial activity of 
exposure 
environment 
Class of Sediment  
10 
N/A 0 
Sand or rock 1 
Sand-mud  3 
Mud 5 
Organic content of 
sediment 
30 
N/A 0 
Low 1 
Medium 3 
High 5 
Availability of Nitrogen 
and Phosphorous (buried) 
20 
N/A 0 
Low N&P 1 
Low organic content +N&P 3 
High organic content + N&P 5 
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Figure 4 Layout of assessment spreadsheet 
The parameters are usually weighted differently according to importance to the variables and 
failure modes/mechanisms which they qualify. Different weighting schemes exist; [24–26] 
show that each scheme is capable of assigning different sets of weights to the parameter set. 
The overall preference values are significantly influenced by these weights. Care should be 
taken to ensure that the right weighting scheme is applied to the MCDA technique when 
finding a solution to the multi-criteria decision problem. In the context in which it is used, 
weighting refers to the relative importance attached to the information carried by each single 
parameter of the variable of the failure mode/mechanisms. This should guide the choice of 
weighting method as the meaning of weighting differ across the various weighting methods. 
More elaboration has been provided in section 2.4. The ideas developed in this framework are 
applicable only to structures in the offshore environment and cannot be used out of context. 
2.3 Methodology 
There are three parts to the 3-D analysis framework: i) information gathering and 
documentation, ii) Multi-criteria risk analysis (description and estimation and evaluation), 
and iii) risk aggregation to overall preference value. These are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
2.3.1 Database build up: information gathering and documentation 
Records of relevant information required for the risk assessment are held in the database. 
Such information includes assumptions and justification comments that might have been 
utilised. Databases serve to ensure that the views of the assessor at the time of assessment are 
captured and documented for future reference and updating. Subsequent assessments of 
failure mode and mechanisms, variables and parameters, following further 
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inspection/monitoring data collection can understand quickly the rationale behind the 
previous ones and modify accordingly. Based on characteristics of the variables, they are 
classified as belonging to one likelihood of O, S and Gs, in a similar way to that used in [27]. 
More so, it is worthy to mention here that only risk due to progressive failures alone have 
been considered. Reduction of risk due to accidental failure have to consider the availability 
of –and effectiveness of –other safety provisions such as emergency exit and evacuation 
plans. 
2.3.2 Multi-criteria risk analysis: description, evaluation and score elicitation 
The risks inherent in each component are described in terms of the parameters of the 
variables of the failure modes/mechanisms. In this framework, risk criteria are constituted by 
these parameters. Therefore, it is good practice to first get the database ready for application 
before commencement of evaluation. This ensures consistency of assessment across all 
components of the infrastructure. Figure 5 shows the steps in the application of a 3-D risk 
assessment framework.  
 
Figure 5 Framework for 3-D risk assessment model 
As can be seen from the framework, the first step in the analysis of a structural system is to 
decompose it into constituent components. These components will perform differently across 
For each of the failure modes, identify 
variables and parameters of risk: a 
variable is such that an increase or 
decrease influences proportionately the 
risk components of Occurrence, Severity, 
and Safeguard and ultimately the risk 
estimate
Identify all the failure modes, failure 
mechanisms, damage mechanisms, 
deterioration mechanisms, degradation 
mechanisms etc., found in offshore 
industries and/or relevant to offshore 
assets: here in referred to as simple 
Failure mode
Estimate the weight of each parameters. 
This is normalized for each variable
Evaluate for each parameter, the 
preference scale which is a system of 
grading on a scale of 0 to 5 with  5 being 
the worst situation and 0 being the 
situation where it is not applicable or non 
risky.
Choose a subsystem to analyze
Identify the components
Choose a component to analyze
Run the component through every failure 
mode/mechanism of the assessment sheet, 
identifying the relevant failure modes and 
variables. Evaluate and elicit scores  
against parameters as deemed appropriate
are all 
component 
considered?
are all 
subsystems 
considered?
Go to integration of 
scores
Calculate normalized 
decision matrix
Calculate weighted 
normalized values
Derive the positive and 
negative ideal solutions
Calculate the separation 
measures; the Euclidean 
distances metric
Calculate similarity to the 
ideal solution
Choose the alternative in the 
decision matrix with the 
maximum similarity to the 
positive ideal solution (SPIS)
Rank the alternatives from 
most to least preferred 
according to SPIS in 
descending order
Part I Part II Part III
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various failure modes/mechanisms from a risk perspective. This step is followed by multi-
criteria risk analysis of the structural components – i.e., description and estimation of risk 
from the perspective of different variables (of the failure modes) and elicitation of 
appropriate parameter –specific performance scores (values) based on evaluation against the 
preference scales [11,28]. The outcome multi-criteria risk analysis is decision matrix V, with 
rows and columns as components and variables respectively, shown in (5). 
1 2
1 2
1 11 12 1
2 21 22 2
1 2
n
n
n
n
m m m mn
p p p
w w w
c v v v
c v v v
V
c v v v
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Risk evaluation is strongly reliant on judgements by a team of experts drawn from diverse 
disciplines, such as material, corrosion, inspection, production, maintenance, process etc. It is 
expected that years of experience, added to provision of detailed information, will better 
inform experts in making good judgement of O, S and Gs. 
2.3.3 Score aggregation and ranking 
In this step, the parameter-specific performance scores are aggregated in a relational way that 
makes comparison and ranking of the components possible. By aggregating the parameter-
specific performance scores, an attempt is made to model failure scenarios, described as 
listing of, and interaction amongst, failure modes (as well as variables and parameters). Two 
aggregation approaches are presented in this paper to demonstrate possible treatments of the 
parameter –specific performance scores in the analysis of failure modes/mechanisms of the 
fundamental unit(s). As the name implies, a global aggregation approach aggregates all 
parameter-specific performance scores of components across all the fundamental units into a 
m-dimensional vector of overall preference value [𝑷𝑽]𝑚 based on which ranking of the 
components, m can be done. Each element 𝑝𝑣𝑞 of the vector is a solution representing a 
measure of risk contribution of component; c𝑞; (𝑞 = 1,2,3, ⋯ 𝑚) to the system risk. Notable 
use of the result of this analysis is identification of the weakest link [18]; i.e., the component 
with highest score of preference value. On the other hand, local aggregation is performed at 
the levels of each fundamental unit (whence the name –local aggregation). This approach 
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aggregates parameter-specific performance scores of the components –within each 
fundamental unit – into a m-dimensional vector [𝑷𝑽𝑓𝑚]
𝑚
of failure mode-specific preference 
values. A complete implementation of local aggregation approach will yield a matrix 
[𝑷𝑽𝑓𝑚]
𝑚×𝑛
 of m–components and n–failure mode/mechanisms. Each element of this matrix 
𝑝𝑣𝑞×𝑟 represents the proportion of risk content of component 𝐶𝑞; 𝑞 = 1,2, ⋯ 𝑚, that is 
contributed by failure mode/mechanism 𝑓𝑚𝑟; 𝑟 = 1,2, ⋯ 𝑛. 
The difference between the two aggregation approaches can be clearly stated in the following 
ways; global approach generates a vector [𝑷𝑽]𝑚representing system/overall preference 
values used in risk ranking of the components whereas local aggregation approach results a 
matrix [𝑷𝑽𝑓𝑚]
𝑚×𝑛
 of m–components and n–failure mode/mechanisms. Each element of this 
matrix 𝑝𝑣𝑞×𝑟 represents the proportion of risk content of component 𝐶𝑞; 𝑞 = 1,2, ⋯ 𝑚, that is 
contributed by failure mode/mechanism 𝑓𝑚𝑟; 𝑟 = 1,2, ⋯ 𝑛. The result of local integration can 
be used to support such decisions as “what to mitigate” as well as rationalizing the 
distribution of the limited resources. It should be noted that it is possible for both analyses to 
complement each other; however, in the indicative case study used in section 4, the analysis 
has been performed independently. 
2.4 Application of TOPSIS in Multi-criteria risk assessment  
MCDA have different types of algorithms for aggregating performance scores and weights of 
criteria into preference values bases on which the alternatives can be ranked. [30] 
recommended the use of additive and/or subtractive algorithms as against multiplicative 
and/or divisive algorithms which disproportionately exaggerate inaccuracies inherent in 
scores elicitation. A widely used MCDA technique that utilises additive algorithm is TOPSIS 
(Technique for Ordered Preferences using Similarity to the Ideal Solution) [31,32]. Also 
called “ideal solution” MCDA, TOPSIS generates preference values that order a set of 
competing alternatives from the most to least preferred (or desirable) as a function of a 
multiple criteria. The positive ideal solution A+ and negative ideal solution A—, represent 
hypothetical alternatives that consist of most and least desirable weighted normalized levels 
respectively of each criterion across the set of competing alternatives. The TOPSIS 
assumption is that the alternative that is simultaneously closest to the positive ideal solution 
and farthest from the negative ideal solution performs the best in the set. As can be seen from 
the two-criterion comparison of alternatives (Figure 6) it is difficult to pick the best from A1 
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and A2 as each happens to possess just one of the necessary qualities. The preference for 
TOPSIS is because it takes advantage of a wider solution search. TOPSIS’ algorithm is able 
to derive an ideal point and computes Euclidean distances of the alternatives from both 
positive and negative ideal points. 
 
Figure 6 Demonstration of TOPSIS Euclidean distance 
The use of TOPSIS in risk analysis of offshore structures stems from a multivariate 
consideration of failure modes/mechanisms of components towards an estimation of their risk 
contributions. The selection/judgement of the “highest” risk contributor (or the weak-link) is 
a process that can be understood and treated under the discipline of MCDA. Similar 
applications of TOPSIS have been reported in the literature; [33], [34] presented approaches 
to prioritizing failure modes as an alternative to FMEA; [35–38] presented different 
approaches to the assessment and selection of support structure configuration for wind 
turbine projects, while [39]’s approach studied the influence of knowledge background on 
“risks to the development of tidal energy”. In related applications in the construction 
industries, TOPSIS has been applied in a risk criticality study and the ranking of a 
construction object [40,41].  
2.4.1 Steps to implementing TOPSIS 
In the context used here, evaluation criteria refer to variables and parameters of failure 
modes. TOPSIS is implemented for the decision matrix V (5) in the following steps. 
Step (I): Normalization of decision matrix 
A
+
A
A
1
A 2
A
3
Criteria_1
C
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a
_
2
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The values in the decision matrix of alternatives (5) are normalized based on (6). 
2
,
1
1,2,3, ,
;
1,2,3, ,
i j
i j m
i j
i
v i m
r
j n
v





 
(6) 
Step (II): Weighted normalized values  
: 1,2,3, , ; 1,2,3, ,i j j i ju w r i m j n     (7) 
Step (III): Derivation of A* and A— , the positive and negative ideal solutions  
where J1 is the set of benefit attributes and J2 is the set of cost attributes.  
Step (IV): Calculation of separation measures i.e., n-dim. Euclidean distance metric 
The separation from the positive-ideal solution A* is given by 
* * 2
1
( ) 1, ,
n
i i j j
j
S u u i m

    (10) 
The separation from the negative-ideal solution A is given by 
2
1
( ) 1, ,
n
i i j j
j
S u u i m 

    (11) 
Step (V): Calculate similarities to the positive-ideal solution, as follows: 
*  0 1; 1, ,ii
i i
S
C i m
S S

 
   

 (12) 
* * * * *
1 2
1 2
{ , , , , , }
{(max ),(min ) 1, }
j n
i j i j
i i
A u u u u
u j J u j J i m

   
 (8) 
1 2
1 2
{ , , , , , }
{(min ),(max ) 1, }
j n
i j i j
i i
A u u u u
u j J u j J i m
    
   
 (9) 
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Step (VI): Choose the alternatives in the decision matrix with the maximum 
*
iC and rank these 
alternatives from most- to least-preferred according to 
*
iC in descending order. 
2.4.2 Weighting Method 
Weighting plays important role in ordering preferences of alternatives. The interpretation of 
weight is different for different weighting methods. The weighting method is broadly 
classified into Subjective and Objective methods [42] and Hybrid method [43]. Subjective 
weight elicitation is solely the discretion of the DM; however, it may draw inference from the 
decision matrix. An objective weighting method on the other hand derives weights from the 
decision matrix by solving a mathematical model and has no dependence on DM. Some 
examples of popular Subjective weighting methods are; Direct rating, Ranking method, Point 
allocation, Pairwise comparison –as in Analytical Hierarchical Process(AHP), Ratio method, 
Swing method, Graphical weighting, Delphi method, Simple multi-attribute ranking 
technique (SMART). Popular Objective weighting methods are the Entropy method, Criteria 
importance through inter-criteria correlation (CRITIC), Mean weight, Standard Deviation, 
Statistical Variance Procedure [42]. In the direct rating method, the decision maker is asked 
to show the importance of each criterion in an ordinal scale. Ranges of scales vary but 
commonly used ranges are 1-5, 1-7, or 1-10 [44]. This method puts no constraint on the 
expert’s responses, i.e. the weights are not normalized. In addition, the expert has the liberty 
to adjust the weight of any criterion without altering the values of others. Criteria weighting 
by Ranking method is carried out in three sub-methods; rank sum, rank reciprocal, and rank 
exponential [45]. Moving towards class of weighting method known as the direct subjective 
method, is Point Allocation [46]. Here, criteria weight is determined by the decision maker 
who allocates numbers directly to the criteria from a fixed point to reflect their importance 
and such that the sum of all the weights equals that fixed point value. It is a very easy method 
of weighting often adopted for demonstrative purposes only as the weights given by this 
method are not always precise [42]. This method suits the purpose of this paper which is to 
demonstrate the proposed risk assessment methodology and is adopted here. 
Besides TOPSIS, other MCDA approaches have been applied in risk assessment processes. 
[47] presented a hybrid model to estimate the weight of risk criteria using AHP which were 
used in ranking Failure Modes in PROMETHEE. [48] used Measuring Attractiveness by a 
Categorical Based Evaluation Technique (MACBETH) to categorise critical sources of risk 
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to ALSTOM power for meditative purposes. [49] presented an approach to the selection of 
maintenance strategy industrial plants using the Analytical Hierarchical process (AHP). 
These applications show the resourcefulness of MCDA in engineering decision making. 
2.5 Generic Failure Mechanisms of Offshore Energy Structures 
This section presents a list of failure mechanisms widely applicable in the offshore energy 
industry. Records on accidents, incidents, and near misses are valuable industry assets; they 
form the basis for improvements and advancement in safety. Much of this information is 
reported in technical papers [7,50–55], and databases such as WOAD and SPARTA [56–62]. 
Because some failures are induced by incorrect operation, knowledge can be gained about 
such failures by evaluating practices against relevant standards and recommended practices 
such as [63–65]. This information is systematically crystallized out and analysed using 
analysis techniques. At present, there are available collections of possible failure 
modes/mechanism of offshore energy structures and the underlying factors influencing them. 
In the development of this paper, many techniques were used to identify offshore failure 
modes and mechanisms. These included but not limited to, questionnaire survey that targeted 
foremen and operators of various equipment, experts’ views that targeted consultants and 
researchers from academia, and business owners. Reports, Standards and Failure databases 
were also reviewed extensively. The search yielded 23 risk parameters from nine failure 
modes, as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Failure Modes, Variables and Parameters 
No 
(i) 
Failure Modes 
and Mechanism 
(f) 
Variables (x) Parameters (p) 
1 
External 
corrosion 
1.1-Exposure 
(Occurrence variable) 
1.1.1-Sediment type; 1.1.2-Organic content in sludge; 1.1.3-
Organic content in sand; 1.1.4-Water depth; 1.1.5-
Availability of N&P; 1.1.6-Background temperature; 1.1.7-
Environment of exposure; 1.1.8-Exposure environment (for 
Concrete); 1.1.9-Temperature of surrounding (for water); 
1.1.10-Water resistivity; 1.1.11-Exposure environment 
chlorine concentration; 1.1.12-Electrical resistivity of 
concrete; 1.1.13-Splash zone corrosion rate; 1.1.14-Corrosion 
rate of rebar (Icorr); 1.1.15-Corrosion rate in submerged zone 
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and tidal seawater; 1.1.16-External corrosion rate 
1.2-Resistance  
1.2.1-Age of assets; 1.2.2-Compressional strength of 
concrete; 1.2.3-Type of coating. 
1.3-Safeguard 
1.3.1-Condition of the coating on concrete; 1.3.2-Adhesion of 
coating on Structure; 1.3.3-Uniformity of coating condition 
on Structure, 1.3.4-Condition for the particular coating; 
1.3.5-Adherence to established standard for coating repair & 
Maintenance; 1.3.6-Redundancy; 1.3.7-Interval of 
Inspection; 1.3.8-Quality of Inspection-Technology; 1.3.9-
Quality of Inspection-Inspectors; 1.3.10-Loss of metal; 
1.3.11-Assessment of Structural Condition based on visual 
inspection; 1.3.12-Percetage of assets inspected in the last 5 
years; 1.3.13-Established Asset’s inspection frequency met; 
1.3.14-Failure history 
2 
Internal 
corrosion 
2.1-Exposure  
2.1.1-Product Corrosivity; 2.1.2-Evidence of MIC; 2.1.3- 
Evidence of Erosion; 2.1.4-Presence of dead-leg; 2.1.5-
Corrosion rate; 2.1.6-Percentage loss of metal (ILI). 
2.2-Severity 
2.2.1-Effect on Structure health; 2.2.3-Effect on product; 
2.2.4-Personnel health and safety; 2.2.5-Effect on 
environment; 2.2.6-Effect on Image; 2.2.7-Penalty  
2.3-Safeguard 
2.3.1-Time since the last inspection ; 2.3.2- Failure History; 
2.3.3-System inhibition and/or biocidal; 2.3.4-Cleaning 
Compliance programme; 2.3.5-Redundancy; 2.3.6-
Emergency Control; 2.3.7-Accessibility & Ease of repair 
3 
Welding, 
Assembly, & 
Construction 
3.1-Welding  
3.1.1-Year of welding; 3.1.2-Certification of quality of the 
base material; 3.1.3-Weld quality 
3.2-Construction 
3.2.1-Design code according to industrial standard; 3.2.2-
Filler Material; 3.2.3-Joint type; 3.2.4-Quality of pipe; 3.2.5-
Number of repairs during construction 
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3.3-Detectability 
3.3.1-Percentage compliance of the total number of 
inspections to be performed in welding ; 3.3.2-Susceptibility 
of state welds; 3.3.3-Construction defects (dents, bends, 
notches, marks, folds, etc.); 3.3.4-Qualified and benchmarked 
repairmen processes; 3.3.5-Quality control and assurance 
during construction 
4 
Manufacturing 
Defects 
4.1-Material 
4.1.1-Pipe type; 4.1.2-Material; accessories under & 
conformable with piping class 
4.2-Quality 
4.2.1-History of Manufacturing faults; 4.2.2-Material quality 
certification; 4.2.3-Active features such as foundation type, 
specification, grade, diameter information etc. 
5 Fatigue 
5.1-Free span 
5.1.1-Evaluate undercuts according to “scour analysis”; 
5.1.2-Interaction of the free span 
5.2-Fatigue 5.2.1-Surge/surf; 5.2.2-Susceptibility to fatigue 
5.3-Mitigation 5.3.1-Actions 
6 
Overloading and 
Impact 
6.1-Operating 
characteristics 
6.1.1-Wind condition during berthing/anchoring; 6.1.2- 
Currents condition of during berthing/anchoring; 6.1.3-Effect 
of interns boats (for docks Maritimes only); 6.1.4-Variation 
of ship draft during docking/anchoring; 6.1.5-Percentage of 
light weight cargo piles (i.e. under bridges; Pipe Racks) 
visually inspected in past 5 years; 6.1.6-Percentage of Heavy 
load piles installed ; 6.1.7-Visually inspected in last 5 years; 
6.1.8-Permanent loads; 6.1.9-Variable loads; 6.1.10-
Deformations 
6.2-Mitigation 
measures 
6.2.1-Time since last inspection of Piles; 6.2.2-Visual 
inspection of the safety critical systems; 6.2.3-Repair piles 
affected by impacts/overload; 6.3.4-Proper functioning of 
drainage system of Piling docks; 6.3.5-Defence system 
ensures absorption of impact energy from ships 
7 
Third Party 
Damage 
7.1-Activity Level 7.1.1-Activity area 
7.2-Mitigation 
7.2.1-Patrol; 7.2.2-Depth covered; 7.2.3-Mechanical 
Protection; 7.2.4-Ballast piping; 7.2.5-Parameters meet DNV 
OS - F101; 7.2.6-From deep below the water surface to the 
active third-party damage region 
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7.3-Past Records 
7.3.1-Analysis of objects falling under Annex PoF impacts 
party; 7.3.2-Signpost; 7.3.3-Community Education 
Programme, Communications Plan; 7.3.4-Abnormalities 
(mechanical damage) detected and sized by ILI; 7.3.5-Annex 
PoF impacts anchors 
8 
Climate and 
external forces 
8.1-Scour on Seabed 
8.1.1-Debris flows; 8.1.2-Bed depressions due to gas leaks; 
8.1.3-Active faults; 8.1.4-Seismic classification according to 
the NSR-10; 8.1.5-Record of failures due to undercuts; 8.1.6-
Stability in the bottom of the sea; vertical stability criterion 
and two lateral stability criteria 
8.2-Environmental 
Features 
8.2.1-Soil susceptible to liquefaction of sandy strata during 
seismic events; 8.2.2-Earthworks (landslides, erosion); 8.2.3-
Topography and bathymetry conditions; 8.3.4-Heavy rains; 
Tides; 8.3.5-Hurricane history 
9 
Incorrect 
operations 
9.1-Safeguards 
9.1.1-There are established operating procedures and system 
maintenance; 9.1.2-There are operators trained in using 
procedures; 9.1.3-History of failure caused by incorrect 
operations; 9.1.4-Audits; 9.1.5-Actions taken in accordance 
with the audit findings 
 
3.0 Case study of Wave Energy Converter systems  
The case study used in this work as a reference application is a prototype Wave Energy 
Converter (WEC) located in Dawanshan Island in Guangdong Province, China and operating 
at a water depth of 28m, and maximum tidal range of 2.5m at the point of deployment. 
3.1 Overview of WEC System function 
The physical boundaries and functional integration of the WEC are delineated by the block 
diagram as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 A Simplified Block diagram of a Wave Energy Converter 
WEC abstracts energy potential from the sea waves and makes it available to primary users 
in the form of electric power through a series of electromechanical conversion processes. 
The energy acquisition system is a hemispherical shaped buoy suspended at the tip end of a 
hinged frame. When intercepted by an incident wave, the buoy heaves while the frame 
observes a revolute motion about an axis (of revolution). The frame itself is held in position 
by an arm fixed to the stationary ship, as shown in Figure 8. The revolution of the frame 
causes a linear reciprocating motion of the double-acting rod of a hydraulic cylinder which 
in turn pumps fluid to the hydraulic motor generator set, through a high pressure gas 
accumulator and network of steel pipes. Low-energy hydraulic oil drains into the reservoir 
where the oil are temporarily stored and have their remaining residual energy dissipated as 
heat before being returned to the cylinder. 
 
Figure 8: Wave Energy Converter 
3.2 Analysis of selected subsystems of a WEC 
Floating buoy: A floating buoy develops a buoyant force which induces a heave motion 
[66]. Wave buoys and boats operate in a similar environment and are made of similar 
material (carbon fibre reinforced composites) which should have similar failure modes. 
Slamming of waves on the buoy causes overload and impacts which can cause fractures. 
Poor fabrication (manufacturing defects) reduces the resistance to loads and makes the 
structure susceptible to fatigue loads. Buoys can suffer cracks in the laminated skin seen 
where the gel coat has fractured. The impact of waves on stiff buoys also causes fractures 
and holing.  
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Figure 9: A fractured buoy (courtesy of Wave Star Energy) 
Hinged frame: The hinged frame performs a revolute motion about the (upper) revolute joint 
(Figure 10B) of the fixed arm extending from the ship and driving a double-acting rod of the 
hydraulic cylinder bolted to lower the revolute joint. The frame is hollow and made of mild 
carbon steel and operates in the splash zone. This implies that a high rate of internal and 
external corrosion is likely. This however, could be aggravated by biofouling. 
 
Figure 10 A wave energy converter: (A) general description, (B): Hinged frame 
In addition, failure could possibly be initiated in the hinged frame due to welding/assembly/ 
construction activities and/or defects suffered during manufacturing, fatigue, overloading and 
impact, and the possibility of third-party damage from fishing trawlers etc. 
Hydraulic cylinder and double-acting rod: The rod observes translational reciprocating 
motion about the cylinder bore. This pumps oil to the hydraulic motor. The rod is a 40 Ni-Cr 
plated material, manufactured and tested based on DIN ISO 6022. Being that Ni-Cr alloy is 
highly resistant to corrosion, implies that the rod is least susceptible to corrosion attack, 
Revolute joint
Immovable joint 
(Bolt & Nut)
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(Welded)
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however, there is the possibility of buckling under slamming waves due to overloading or 
impact. Figure 11 shows a schematic of a hydraulic cylinder. 
 
Figure 11 Longitudinal cross-section of double-rod double-acting cylinder 
Other damages common to these structures, as reported in [67] are due to O-rings, cracking 
of glands, damage to bearings and seals. These damages are associated with misalignment of 
the load (e.g., bent rod). They cause poor clearances through which leakages can occur. 
Another cause of poor clearance is bad assembly. A split weld around the base and ports of 
cylinders is another damage feature commonly observed. These are caused by stress-
increasing mechanisms, such as fatigue, and/or stress-induced, such as manufacturing defect, 
welding, assembly and construction. There is the possibility of fracture from being operated 
beyond recommended conditions. Such mechanisms are considered here under “Incorrect 
operation”. Lastly, contamination of the hydraulic fluid by seawater, and corroded, eroded or 
worn out parts, such as the end cap can potentially cause failure in delivering the hydraulic 
fluid to the motor. This has a root cause as wrong operations are usually from wrong filter 
size or operating at a high case pressure. 
Motor and Generator: The hydraulic cylinder transfers the fluid at high pressure to the motor 
which turns the turbine. The major failure modes of motor and generator are highlighted in 
studies by [68–70]. They include but not restricted to, excessive leakage, seal failure and 
noise. At a component level the failure modes are identified as follows; corrosion (in winding 
and magnets), spalling, wear (in bearing and blades), overload - impact (seal, blade, shaft and 
bearing), adjustment error during welding assembly, construction and/or manufacturing 
leading to misalignment of shaft, rotor asymmetry, bearing shells and/or roller element, 
fatigue as experienced in shaft, slip ring and blade. 
Forward StrokeBackward Stroke
Piston rod Port (A) Chamber (A) PistonPiston seal Chamber (B) Cylinder Bore Port (B)
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Pipeline: The pipeline serves as a channel through which hydraulic fluid moves from the 
cylinder to the motor-generator set. This may suffer crack or burst (in the worst cases) due to 
overloading and impact. The occurrence of these failure modes could be further aggravated 
by internal and/or external corrosion at a rate that is influenced by parameters such as 
ambient temperature and moisture content, corrosivity of hydraulic fluid etc. Fatigue may 
result from dynamics associated with fluid flowing in a pipe or from vibration due to 
assembly error, i.e., too big a clearance, resulting in misalignment and mostly caused by 
errors in welding, assembly and construction and/or manufacturing defects. 
Gas accumulator: The gas accumulator is used to maintain stability of flow by keeping the 
pressure of the pipeline at the required level. In bladder-type gas accumulators, the flexible 
bladder holds the compressible gas at the pre-charged pressure and may rupture in the event 
of overloading or impact during pre-charging or an out-of-proportion reduction in system 
pressure. Other causes of rupture are incorrect compression ratio, incorrect pre-charge 
pressure [71] which are all incorrect operations. Fatigue failure may also be experienced in 
the spring and poppet assembly of the gas accumulator. 
Valves: A pattern can be drawn between type of valve and failure. However, reference is 
made here of generic types as found in [72–74]. Valves used in hydraulic systems, such as a 
WEC to control behaviour of the hydraulic fluid, are of three types; Pressure valve, Flow 
valve and Directional valve. Valve faults such as abrasion and wear usually have, as a causal 
factor, improper assembly which creates uneven loading and tilting of the valve-plate. Valves 
may experience other failures, such as internal corrosion, erosion, valve defects, mechanical 
failure, fatigue and wear. Mechanical failure results from actions such as welding, assembly 
and construction, and incorrect/defective/improper operational procedures (such as wrong 
specification, human factor). It is very common to expect incorrect operation where 
manufacturing and material defects are observed, where in fact, the problem is not the valve 
itself but something that has been done to affect the valve operation. This is said to constitute 
50% of the causes of valve incidents [72]. 
3.3 Demonstration of Implementation of 3-D framework 
This section demonstrates the implementation of the 3-D framework, as documented in 
section 2, on a real system of a WEC. A single variable – microbial activity level in the 
sediment – of the threat of external corrosion (Table 2) is used for demonstrative purposes in 
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order to illustrate the concept of parameters and variables. Table 3 shows the performance of 
the components of a WEC exposed to microbial activity. Score has been elicited according to 
current conditions of the variables. The weights of the criteria are derived by the point 
allocation method [42]. In a more detailed assessment, it is recommended that a more robust 
method such a AHP [34,75–77] be used in determining the weights. The evaluation was 
carried out by a team of five experts involved in the WEC project and drawn from Cranfield 
University, UK and the National Ocean Technology Center, Tianjin, China. Each of the 
components of the WEC had been assessed under the parameters and had scores assigned to 
them as provided by the evaluation scale. 
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Table 3 Evaluation based on one variable of external corrosion  
Variable Parameters 
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Microbial 
activity 
level in 
sediment 
Class of Sediment  15 
Mud  5 
5 5 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 4 5 4 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 3 
Sand-mud  3 
Sand or rock  1 
Not applicable 0 
Organic content in 
sediment (sludge) 
20 If mud 
High 3 
2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium 2 
Low  0 
If sand 
High 5 
Medium 3 
Low  2 
Water depth 15 
Superficial (<200 ft) 5 
5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Deeper (>200 ft)) 2 
Not applicable 0 
Availability of 
Nitrogen and 
Phosphorous 
20 
High organic content+ 
N&P 
5 
5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Low organic content + 
N&P 
2 
Low N&P 0 
Background 
Temperature 
30 
> 10
o C  5 
2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 < 10
o C   2 
Not applicable 0 
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The set of positive-ideal, 𝐴+and negative-ideal, 𝐴−solutions as derived for the normalized 
decision matrix from (8) and (9) respectively are: 
A* = {0.014, 0.051, 0.035, 0.039, 0.017}        (13) 
A- = {0.000, 0.003, 0.001, 0.001, 0.007}        (14) 
Measures of separation from positive and negative ideal solutions as derived from (10) and 
(11) respectively are: 
*
iS  = {0.010, 0.010, 0.011, 0.050, 0.071, 0.071, 0.071, 0.071, 0.071, 0.071, 0.065, 0.065, 0.071, 
0.072, 0.072, 0.071, 0.071, 0.071, 0.072, 0.072, 0.071}      (15) 
iS

 = {0.072, 0.072, 0.072, 0.052, 0.013, 0.013, 0.012, 0.013, 0.012, 0.015, 0.020, 0.019, 0.012, 
0.010, 0.010, 0.012, 0.012, 0.012, 0.010, 0.010, 0.013}     (16) 
The similarity to both 𝑆+& 𝑆− solutions is computed as given in (12). 
*
iC = {0.874, 0.874, 0.870, 0.512, 0.157, 0.157, 0.141, 0.157, 0.141, 0.175, 0.238, 0.222, 0.141, 
0.126, 0.126, 0.141, 0.141, 0.141, 0.126, 0.126, 0.157}.     (17) 
The risk performance indices for the different components are expressed in (17). This is 
presented in bar chart form in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Risk performance indices for different component from exposure to microbial induced 
external corrosion 
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It can be deduced from Figure 12 that 54% of the risk of external corrosion due to activities 
of microbial activities lies in just 19% of the components. These components are: wave buoy 
and the frame, and the two joints. The results of a full scale implementation of the framework 
on the structure and incorporating variables from all the threats and failure modes will be 
presented in the next section. 
4.0 Result and Discussion 
A total of 21 components of the WEC were analysed and evaluated against 112 parameters of 
the nine generic failure mechanisms. Figure 13 shows the results of the global aggregation 
approach i.e., the plot of [𝑷𝑽]𝑚 as described in 2.3.3. It can be seen from Figure 13 that 
about half of the system’s risk is concentrated in just 23% of the components: Generator 
components –seals, generator’s windings and magnet, motor shaft, and generator blade. The 
implication of this from an IRM perspective is that it would be inefficient to inspect, repair 
and maintain all components with the same level of priority. Rather, a recommended IRM 
plan should identify the 23% of components and raise their priority level.  
The result obtained from full implementation of local aggregation approach; the matrix 
[ ]
𝑚 𝑛
(see section 2.3.3) is presented in Table 4. The plotted of these values are as 
shown in the scatter of Figure 15. It shows the relative activity levels of various failure 
modes/mechanisms in each component. As can be seen from Figure 15, errors from welding-
assembly-construction (WAC) constitutes the active threats to components wave buoys, 
hinge frame, revolute joints(frame), frame welds, and cylinder piston. From IRM point of 
view, these threats should be inspected in those components. Similarly, the first three active 
failure modes/ mechanisms for pipeline (component J) are MAD, INC, and error of WAC. 
The threats that develop through these failure modes/mechanisms should be monitored 
through inspection. Another way the data of Table 4 can be treated is to perform row –sum 
which gives the total risk content of the components. This gives an interesting pattern when 
normalised (Figure 14) that captures the distributions of failure mode/mechanism –specific 
risks for each component of the system. This analysis avails the assets manager/engineer the 
knowledge of susceptibility of the various components of the asset to the failure 
mode/mechanisms; the results which will serves as a supports tool to the asset 
manager/engineer who may be required to defend maintenance decisions from time to time 
such as setting priority of failure mode to mitigate for each component. 
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Figure 13 Distribution of Risk in a WEC system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0381
0.0374
0.0341
0.0338
0.0268
0.0288
0.0252
0.0123
0.0246
0.0314
0.0365
0.0306
0.0304
0.0311
0.0343
0.0377
0.0434
0.0542
0.0777
0.1178
0.2136
0 0.1 0.2
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
Components Relative risk
H
ig
h
-risk
 zo
n
e
2
3
%
L
o
w
 risk
 zo
n
e 
7
7
%
Wave buoy
Hinge frame
Frame Rev. Joint
Frame Weld. Joint
Cylinder piston
Cylinder
Cylinder rod
Cylinder seal
Cylinder bearing
Pipelines
Hoses
Valves
Acc. bladder
Acc. Spring
Acc. Poppet
Motor bearing
Generator blades
Motor shaft
Generator magnets
Generator windings
Generator seals
28 
 
Table 4 Performance of the components under Failure modes 
Component Risk sources and Events 
INC ETC WAC MAD FTG O&I TPD ICO CEF 
Wave buoy 0.3717 0.6109 0.9857 0.1024 0.7154 0.3365 0.6470 0.4967 0.8651 
Hinge frame 0.3802 0.6117 0.9942 0.4503 0.5449 0.4364 0.6454 0.4967 0.3737 
Frame Rev. Joint 0.2930 0.6109 0.9848 0.1646 0.3885 0.2123 0.6454 0.4965 0.4305 
Frame Weld Joints 0.2927 0.6109 0.9866 0.2178 0.7099 0.3899 0.6454 0.4949 0.3737 
Cylinder piston 0.0819 0.2603 0.9995 0.1634 0.3764 0.1401 0.3127 0.1702 0.4531 
Cylinder 0.1963 0.1152 0.0682 0.0890 0.3680 0.4757 0.5827 0.1702 0.4080 
Cylinder rod 0.1650 0.1246 0.5677 0.1537 0.4580 0.3281 0.5828 0.1702 0.3087 
Cylinder seal 0.1465 0.1204 0.5111 0.0859 0.3756 0.4103 0.3222 0.1702 0.1910 
Cylinder bearing 0.0746 0.1465 0.5120 0.0890 0.1975 0.4380 0.3897 0.1702 0.1349 
Pipeline 0.7573 0.1263 0.7436 0.7797 0.5286 0.4399 0.3582 0.1702 0.3087 
Hoses 0.7881 0.2061 0.5482 0.5799 0.7658 0.5276 0.5702 0.5572 0.3737 
Valve 0.6955 0.2199 0.5500 0.3197 0.4644 0.1679 0.0786 0.1605 0.3087 
Accumulator Bladder 0.0637 0.0168 0.5110 0.2170 0.4580 0.5878 0.0103 0.1605 0.0713 
Accumulator Spring 0.0652 0.1022 0.2587 0.3197 0.5815 0.2470 0.0103 0.1605 0.1349 
Poppet 0.0652 0.1004 0.5142 0.3230 0.5936 0.3863 0.0103 0.1605 0.0000 
Motor Bearing 0.0750 0.4204 0.5122 0.1577 0.2846 0.4413 0.1015 0.5082 0.0713 
Generator blades 0.0736 0.4202 0.5539 0.1635 0.0668 0.1562 0.0103 0.5082 0.0000 
Motor shaft 0.1424 0.4202 0.6334 0.5803 0.5594 0.7289 0.0103 0.5035 0.1349 
Generator magnet 0.0512 0.0164 0.5099 0.0265 0.3885 0.2041 0.0103 0.1605 0.0713 
Gen. Windings 0.1359 0.0913 0.5099 0.3207 0.1538 0.2876 0.0103 0.1605 0.0000 
Motor seals 0.0759 0.1011 0.5101 0.0276 0.5815 0.4297 0.1015 0.1605 0.0713 
INC = Internal corrosion; ETC = External corrosion; WAC = Welding, Assembly, and Construction; MAD = 
Manufacturing defect; FTG = Fatigue; O&I = Overloading & Impact; TPD = Third party damage; ICO = 
Incorrect operation; CEF = Climate & External forces 
29 
 
 
Figure 14 Normalized sum of component’s failure mode-specific risk score  
 
Figure 15: Contribution of failure modes towards components risk 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, a framework is developed to support prioritisation of components of offshore 
engineering systems based on risk levels for intervention action, leading to inspection, repair 
and maintenance. The advantage of this framework is the systematic way it incorporates a 
wide range of evaluation criteria and still demonstrates clarity in risk level estimation, 
aggregation and prioritisation in a manner that ensures repeatability. Precision of ranking is 
enhanced through a combination of actions; firstly, an updatable database is developed for 
failure modes, risk variables and parameters. These parameters hold information on operating 
conditions –normal and/or upset, current and projected future of the components, required in 
order to make informed judgement of occurrence, severity of failure modes and safeguards. 
This enhances the traceability of the assessment outcomes to the source data. The direct 
implication of this is that the model can easily be updated with the latest information as 
obtained from inspection findings. Also, it addresses epistemic uncertainties and ensures 
uniformity of application during the evaluation process. Secondly, it minimizes subjectivity 
in risk evaluation through consideration of weighting at parameters levels – which qualify the 
variables of failure modes. This is in contrast to the practice in FMEA where weights are 
considered at the failure mode level resulting in a high subjective model. For demonstrative 
purposes, these weights had been derived through a point allocation process. Thirdly, it 
provides a systematic way of application of risk assessment across components of complex 
engineering systems such that is possible to perform risk assessment of different components 
simultaneously with a lower risk of subjectivity, and reduced inaccuracy. 
The framework has been implemented on a real offshore structure, a WEC, and the results 
obtained showed to have practical implications to efficient IRM management of components 
of offshore energy structures. Initial prioritisation of components by global aggregation 
approach is usually based on previous inspection records. Subsequent prioritisation requires 
up-to-date information via inspections finding that target prioritised components. If a 
component shows no sign of developing defect – by maintaining the same relative position in 
the priority scale for recurring inspection – it should be credited by increasing the time to the 
following inspection. In other words, the question of “how often to inspect” is addressed. 
More so, the efficiency of IRM can be further enhanced by suggesting “what to inspect”. This 
is where the second analysis –local aggregation approach –finds application. A scatter plot 
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of [ ]
𝑚×𝑛
 (Figure 15) shows the failure modes/mechanisms arranged in order of 
decreasing activity level. This result is vital for defence of decisions on budget allocations for 
inspection repair and maintenance. 
For the case study presented, it should be noted that the result is validated based on the 
experience of the participating researchers in the project. This is due to the fact that the area 
of renewable energy is relatively new, as such there are not enough data for validation. 
Though an attempt is made in this paper to list as many failure mode/mechanism and 
variables and parameters as possible, such analysis inherently is perforce finite; whereas in 
reality such list is infinite. However, the model is highly flexible in terms of accommodating 
new found failure modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters and can be adapted for many 
purposes. Identification and inclusion of new failure modes/mechanisms, variables and 
parameters as more knowledge is gained is dependent on the experience assessor.  
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